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John de Saram*
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I take a somewhat different view of the
International Law Commission and its work.

The methods and procedures of the Commission, as in the case of
all human endeavors, need, of course, to be kept under regular review and
to be improved wherever advisable. The methods and procedures of the
Commission were referred to in the Sixth (the Legal) Committee of the
UN General Assembly over the two weeks just passed, in the course of
Sixth Committee consideration of the Report of the Commission.
The Resolution on the Commission to be adopted by the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee, though still in
negotiation, will, I believe, request the Commission to review next year,
1996, the final year of its present quinquennium (1992 to 1996), its
methods and procedures of work in light of its experience over the
quinquennium.
The Commission will report next year to the Sixth Committee, and
I expect that in the fall of next year the Sixth Committee will consider
Commission methods and procedures as well as the methods and
procedures followed by the Sixth Committee itself when the Sixth
Committee debates the Reports of the Commission.
A number of the specific points made by Professor Mcaffrey as to
the methods and procedures of the Commission, as well as such other
points as may be raised in the Commission itself, will this and will be
considered next year both by the Commission and the Sixth Committee.
II
Yet it would be incorrect if the impression were to be left that the
Commission was without useful purpose and just drifting aimlessly along.
Whether or not a convention prepared by the Commission has been
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brought into force by governments within a short period of time is
certainly not appropriate criterion of the usefulness or worthiness of the
Commission. One need only refer to the many examples of conventions
that have taken several years to enter into force (the 1969 Convention on
the Law of Treaties and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea come
immediately to mind), yet which have not in the meanwhile been without
considerable influence on governments and governmental practice.
Though the membership of the Commission are nominated by
governments and elected by the General Assembly, members of the
Commission serve in their individual capacities. This is as it and was
intended to be and should be. The Commission is not, in other words, just
another committee of governmental representatives. It is required to have,
and does have, careful regard to both governmental and non-governmental
opinion: to the views of the practitioner of international law but to those
of the academic as well, to the former for guidance as to trends in state
practice and to the latter for opinion as to what, in light of principle, is the
proper "doctrinal" course.
The proposals of the Commission are in the nature of
recommendations to the General Assembly on what, in the view of the
Commission, the law presently is, codification, and on what, in the view
of the Commission, the law ought to be, progressive development. One
cannot, of course, assume that the views of the Commission, the General
Assembly, and governments will always be comfortable. Yet neither
should one assume that the recommendations of the Commission, even
though not brought by governments speedily into force, are without
persuasiveness.
III
A glance at the record of the past four years of the present
quinquennium of the Commission, moreover, is surely not unimpressive.
In 1993 and 1994, the Commission, as requested by the General
Assembly, did an extraordinary amount of work in the preparation of a
statute for the establishment of an international criminal court. It is true
that there still remain a number of difficulties to be resolved in the statute,
such as the provisions of the statute relating to the Security Council. Yet,
whatever the ultimate disposition of the Commission's statute for an
international criminal court, the fact should remain that the Commission
took the concept of an international criminal court much, much, further
than it had ever been taken, since the subject of an international criminal
court was first placed on the international legal agenda in the early 1950s.
Whatever each of us may feel as to the usefulness or likelihood of an
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international criminal court, we must recognize that there was, and is, a
very substantial body of world opinion in favor of very serious
consideration now being given to the question of the establishment of an
international criminal court.
Nor should the work of the Commission on the "Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" be lightly dismissed.
It is true that, in the interests of arriving at a consensus within the
Commission, initial proposals made by its Special Reporter as to the
subject-matter scope of the Code have been very substantially reduced.
It is also true that there is a substantial body of opinion to the
effect that, given the incorporation into the proposed Statute for an
international criminal court of definitions of international crimes in treaties
presently in force for the purpose of demarcating the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Court, no useful purpose would be served by the
elaboration of a Code of Crimes against the peace and security of
mankind. Yet there is also a substantial body of opinion that holds that
there are a number of international crimes that would not be provided for
in the Statute for an international criminal court, and that the inclusion of
such international crimes in a code, be it only for deterrent effect, would
begin a process of consolidation into a single code of the substantive law of
international crimes. And it is difficult to conclude that the world does not
seem ready for such a code of international crimes.
The work of the Commission in the last four years on "State
responsibility" has also, I would think, been extraordinarily useful. There
was in the Commission, in 1994 and 1995, one of the most interesting
discussions ever, in any forum, of the controversial concept of state crimes
and of the controversial concept of counter-measures. In 1995, there were
also a number of provisions completed by the Commission for Part Three,
the concluding section, of its Articles on State Responsibility which would
provide for the settlement of disputes; and that would provide particularly
for settlement of disputes in situations where one state has taken a
counter-measure against another state.
The work of the Commission in the field of counter-measures has
been very much in the area of progressive development, given the
sparseness of authoritative international judicial or arbitral decision with
respect to this issue.
Though still incomplete, the work of the
Commission, certainly in my view, is a most impressive example of
consensus procedure working as it should in legal deliberative bodies: a
reaching out for the highest level of agreement possible on sensitive and
controversial matters.
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IV
Of course, if the subjects placed on its agenda are too broad, or
contain too great a component of political sensitivity, or should a subject
contain at its core a fundamental but unresolved question of great legal
principle, great difficulties arise in the Commission.
This is particularly so as the Commission must have regard not
only to the nature of state practice but also to non-governmental opinion
and also because the Commission always proceeds in its work by way of
consensus, except in very ultimate recourse.
If the subject of "state responsibility" is a subject of great breadth
of scope and if the "Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind" is one of high political sensitivity, then the subject of "Liability
for injurious consequence of activities not prohibited by international law"
is one which contains at its core a fundamental but unresolved question of
great legal principle and great practical implication. The question is
whether the criterion of "due diligence" is the legally necessary, or the
practically sensible, standard for determinations as to the basis of the
obligation to compensate in cases of physical transboundary harm.
The fact that injurious consequences in one state of an activity in
another state, which are not prohibited by international law, may be
extremely substantial or even catastrophic exacerbates complexities. The
question of the basis of the obligation to compensate in physical
transboundary harm cases has not as yet been clarified in the Commission.
Whether or not the Commission reaches consensus conclusions, its debates
and working documents on the issue will undoubtedly be followed very
carefully outside the Commission and will be of substantial interest to
those concerned with the development of international law in such
transboundary cases.
Authoritative precedent in the form of international judicial or
arbitral decisions is sparse, and found by some to offer no guidance.
Further, treaty practice or custom are indeterminative largely because, it
would seem, governmental representatives are, quite understandably,
sensitive to the very great implications of the question of the obligation to
compensate for physical transboundary harm and have, therefore, hesitated
in treaty or in practice to resolve the basic legal question that needs to be
considered. The one exception to this observation is the 1972 Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Objects Launched into
Outer Space. Thus, recourse would seem to be necessary, in terms of
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." And there, of
course, one finds a substantial body of national precedent for a moving
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away on occasions, such as in cases of extra-hazardous activities, from the
"due diligence" criterion. Yet it is not at all an easy question to resolve
and understandably has occupied much time within the Commission.
V
Thus, I would think that the record of the Commission's present
quinquennium would show that the Commission, which proceeds, as it
should, in the light of governmental and non-governmental opinion and
through consensus-procedure, is useful and worthy. But, of course, it is
important that the subjects placed on the agenda of the Commission and its
methods and procedures, as in the case of all legal deliberative bodies, be
kept under continuous and careful review.

